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3.1 Overview of Structure of the Model
In this chapter we describe the basic structure of the model that we use
to calculate each equilibrium. We begin with an overview of the entire
model, and then we present each feature in greater detail. The appendix
to this chapter provides a glossary of notation, including each symbol in
order of appearance in the text, the definition of that symbol, the equa-
tion where it is first used, and the data or source of its derivation. The
model's structure is summarized diagrammatically in figure 3.1. We begin
our discussion with an overview of the production side of the model,
which is represented on the left-hand side of the diagram.
The model includes nineteen profit-maximizing producer good indus-
tries, which are listed in table 3.1. Each industry uses labor and capital in
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) value-added function. We
choose substitution elasticities for each industry from the econometric
literature. Values typically range from 0.6 to 1.0, as described in chapter
6. The Survey of Current Business (SCB) and unpublished data from the
National Income Division of the Bureau of Economic Analysis are used
to obtain each industry's payments for labor and capital in the 1973
benchmark equilibrium. Like Harberger (1966), we determine the quan-
tities of primary inputs (labor and capital) by using the convention that a
unit of each primary factor is that amount which earns one dollar net of
taxes in the benchmark year. For intermediate inputs of other commod-
ities, we derive a fixed-coefficient input-output matrix from Bureau of
Economic Analysis tables.
As indicated in figure 3.1, final demands for each producer good in-
clude direct demands by government, demands for export, and demand





















































































































pappy27 The Single Period Submodel
demanded indirectly. We use a fixed-coefficient Z matrix of transition
between the nineteen producer goods and the fifteen consumer goods.
The Z matrix is shown in figure 3.1, and the fifteen consumer goods are
listed in table 3.1. This transition is necessary because the Commerce
Department data include industries such as mining, machinery, and
trade, while the Labor Department's Survey of Consumer Expenditures
provides data on purchases of goods like furniture, appliances, and
recreation.







3. Crude petroleum and gas
4. Contract construction
5. Food and tobacco
6. Textiles, apparel,
and leather




























8. Clothing and jewelry
9. Transportation




13. Reading, recreation, and miscellaneous
14. Nondurable, nonfood household items
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Table 3.1 also shows the 1973 income levels that define the twelve
household classes. Industry and government payments to buy labor and
capital services are matched by total household receipts from the supply
of each factor. The Treasury Department's Merged Tax File provides
information on labor and capital income for each of the twelve consumer
classes. The Merged Tax File also provides data on tax payments and an
estimate of the average marginal income tax rate for each group. These
marginal tax rates range from 1 percent for the first income classes to 40
percent for the highest income class. As discussed later in this chapter, we
model the graduated income tax system as a series of linear schedules,
one for each group. Then, as discussed in chapter 5, we estimate that 30
percent of savings flow through tax-free vehicles such as pensions, Indi-
vidual Retirement Accounts, and Keogh plans. This fact is reflected in
the model by exempting a fixed 30 percent of savings from personal
income taxation.
Table 3.2 provides a brief description of the treatment of taxes in the
model. The corporation income tax, state corporate franchise tax, and
local property taxes are modeled as ad valorem taxes on each industry's
use of capital. The Social Security payroll tax and workmen's compensa-
tion tax are modeled as ad valorem taxes on industry use of labor.
Various federal excise taxes and indirect business taxes are modeled as
output taxes for each of the nineteen industries. State and local sales
taxes apply to each of the consumer goods.
Another important feature of our model is the personal factor tax. This
construct is described more thoroughly later, but it is designed to capture
the features of the personal income tax that discriminate among indus-
tries. For each industry we calculate the fraction of capital income that is
fully taxable at the personal level. This fraction is determined using data
on dividends, capital gains, interest, and rent. The personal factor tax
acts as a withholding tax at the industry level. We model personal taxes
on capital as if they were collected at the industry level at the overall
average marginal personal income tax rate. At the consumer level,
rebates are given to groups with lower rates, while additional taxes are
collected from those with higher than average marginal tax rates. The
model thus captures the favorable treatment of industries with a high
proportion of retained earnings, industries that receive large amounts of
noncorporate investment tax credits, and the housing industry.
Consumer demands are based on budget-constrained maximization of
a nested CES/Cobb-Douglas utility function. In the first stage of the
maximization process, consumers save some income for future consump-
tion. They allocate the rest to a subutility function defined over present
consumption and leisure. The elasticity of substitution between future
and present consumption is based on estimates of the elasticity of saving29 The Single Period Submodel
with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return. These estimates, and our
choice among them, are discussed in section 6.4.3. In our standard case
we use Michael Boskin's (1978) estimate of 0.4 for the uncompensated
saving elasticity, but we also perform sensitivity analyses using different
values. Consumers make their saving decisions under the (myopic) ex-
pectation that all present prices, including the rental price of capital, will
prevail in all future periods. In the second stage of the consumer's
maximization problem, consumers allocate income between current con-
sumption goods and leisure. The elasticity of substitution between leisure
and consumer goods is based on estimates of the elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the net-of-tax wage. These are discussed in section 6.4.2.
In our standard case we use an estimate of 0.15 for the uncompensated
labor supply elasticity, but again we perform sensitivity analyses. Ex-
penditures on individual consumption goods are based on a Cobb-
Douglas subutility function.
Consumer decisions regarding factor supplies are made jointly with
consumption decisions. Demands for leisure and for saving depend on
the prices of both factors and goods. The model simultaneously considers
the uses of income and the sources of income in determining the utility of
any group.
Saving is converted immediately into investment demand for producer
goods. The distribution of investments among producer goods is based on
national accounting data for fixed private investment and inventories. We
model the foreign trade sector with constant elasticity export supply and
import demand functions. This treatment closes the model, maintains the
trade balance, and makes it easy for us to calculate trade quantities, once
prices are known.
We complete the static model by specifying the government sector.
The government uses revenues from the various taxes for transfer pay-
ments and for purchases of labor, capital, and producer goods. The
government budget is always in balance. Lump-sum transfers to each
consumer group are based on unpublished Treasury Department data for
Social Security receipts, welfare, government retirement, food stamps,
and similar programs. We assume that the government demands factors
and commodities according to fixed expenditure shares.
3.2 Treatment of Taxes
In table 3.2 we give a brief summary of the ways in which we model the
components of the United States tax system. These treatments fall
squarely within the Harberger tradition, but they also reflect our best
summary judgments regarding the incentive effects of each tax. Con-




United States Taxes and Their Treatment in the Model
Treatment
1. Corporate taxes (including state and
local) and corporate franchise
taxes
2. Property taxes
3. Social Security taxes, unemployment
insurance, and workmen's com-
pensation
4. Motor vehicles tax
5. Retail sales taxes
6. Excise taxes
7. Other indirect business taxes and
nontax payments to government
8. Personal income taxes (including
state and local)
Ad valorem tax on use of capital ser-
vices by industry
Ad valorem tax on use of capital ser-
vices by industry
Ad valorem tax on use of labor services
by industry
Ad valorem tax on use of motor vehi-
cles by producers
Ad valorem tax on purchases of pro-
ducer goods
Ad valorem tax on output of producer
goods
Ad valorem tax on output of producer
goods
Linear function for each consumer; 30
percent of savings currently tax shel-
tered
many parts of the tax system. In this book we do not test the sensitivity of
our results to most of these treatments, but we mention some of the
alternative treatments that economists have proposed.
We treat corporate taxes as ad valorem taxes on the use of capital
services, with different rates across industries. For each industry we
calculate an average effective tax rate by looking at the ratio of observed
taxes to a measure of observed capital income. In the standard model we
assume that the rate on marginal investment is equal to this average rate
in each industry. Joseph Stiglitz (1973) has emphasized that interest
payments are deductible from the corporate tax, so there would be no
corporate tax on the normal income earned by a debt-financed invest-
ment. Stiglitz then argues that if corporations use debt finance at the
margin, the corporate tax will be nondistortionary. Whereas our simula-
tions in chapter 8 imply that the corporate tax leads to serious welfare
losses, this would not be the case if all investments were debt financed at
the margin. Since we do not model the choice among different financial
assets, we do not deal explicitly with the different tax treatments of debt
and equity.
1
1. Tax rates equal the ratio of taxes to capital income in each industry, so they reflect
lower corporate taxes in debt-intensive industries. Since these tax rates apply to marginal
uses of capital in the model, we implicitly assume that marginal investments are financed by
the average proportions of debt and equity.31 The Single Period Submodel
A second issue concerning the corporate tax arises from our assump-
tion that marginal and average capital tax rates are equal. A cost-of-
capital approach can be used to calculate tax distortions at the margin, as
done by Fullerton and Gordon (1983). This procedure leads to tax rate
estimates that are different from those used in most of this book. The
choice between the marginal cost of capital approach and the average
effective tax rate approach is a difficult one. The advantage of the former
is that it is more consistent with the microeconomic theory, while a
disadvantage is that it cannot capture the extreme complexity of the tax
code.
Finally, as emphasized by Fullerton and Gordon (1983), an explicit
treatment of risky investments can greatly alter the standard results. If
the real risk-free return to corporate investment is only a small part of
total corporate income, then most of the tax applies to a risk premium.
Since government would take an equal share of risk and the premium,
these taxes would not distort investment behavior at the margin. Only the
tax on the real risk-free return would be distorting. In contrast to Fuller-
ton and Gordon, Bulow and Summers (1984) argue that the corporate tax
does not share risk proportionately. The appropriate treatment of risk is
therefore not clear. For further discussion, see Slemrod (1982, 1983).
We also treat property taxes as ad valorem taxes on the use of capital
services. Charles Tiebout (1956) shows that, under a set of special
assumptions about the provision of local public goods, local property
taxes may be thought of as benefit-related charges. Therefore, these taxes
could also be modeled as nondistortionary. We doubt, however, that the
restrictive assumptions necessary for the Tiebout model are matched very
closely in the actual economy.
2
Some would model the property tax as an excise tax rather than as a tax
on capital income. Mieszkowski (1972) reconciles these two views by
pointing out that a common tax rate in all jurisdictions would operate as a
factor tax while deviations from this common rate would have excise tax
effects. Our model captures the fact that property tax rates on capital
income differ by industry, so our general equilibrium results include
excise tax effects on the prices of industry outputs. (Since we model the
government as a single jurisdiction, we do not measure the effects of the
differences in property taxes among different local governments.)
We treat Social Security payroll taxes as ad valorem taxes on the use of
labor services by industry, and we treat Social Security benefits as lump-
sum transfers. It could be argued that the Social Security system is a
contributor-financed insurance scheme that has no distorting effects by
2. Fullerton and Gordon (1983) also investigate results in a model with nondistorting
property taxes.32 Chapter Three
industry. Our treatment abstracts from these controversies.
3 Also, we do
not capture the effect of Social Security on saving through the substitu-
tion of Social Security wealth for private sector capital accumulation, or
the effect of Social Security on retirement decisions. For a discussion of
these issues, see Feldstein (1974c).
We also treat unemployment compensation taxes as an ad valorem tax
on the use of labor services, and unemployment benefits as lump-sum
transfer receipts. Once again the relationship between benefits and con-
tributions is inexact. Most states have minimum and maximum tax rates,
such that firms with high or low rates of unemployment do not have
actuarially fair tax rates.
We model sales and excise taxes as consumer purchase taxes on the
fifteen goods. For most of the consumer goods, this treatment is probably
not controversial. However, taxes on alcohol and tobacco could be
viewed as Pigovian externality-correcting taxes. Gasoline taxes are used
to support highway construction, and thus might be modeled as if they
were related to benefits.
We model income taxes as linear functions of income for each of the
twelve consumer groups. Each group has a negative intercept and a single
positive marginal tax rate. Thus, although we capture the fact that the tax
system is progressive, we do not capture the fact that each consumer faces
a graduated rate schedule. We also do not account for the high implicit
marginal tax rates faced by recipients of transfers who might be able to
work (see Aaron 1973).
Clearly, our model of the tax system is not the only model that one
could adopt. We have tried to adopt a simple treatment for each tax,
while at the same time recognizing the diverse controversies that exist in
the literature.
3.3 Value Added and Intermediate Production
We assume that there are two primary factors of production—capital
and labor—each of which is homogeneous, mobile among sectors,
4 and
internationally immobile.
5 Capital, K, is owned by the twelve consumer
3. Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980) find that the Social Security system provides a net
benefit for older workers. See Burkhauser and Turner 1981 for a reply. While the degree of
net tax or benefit may depend greatly on age and other personal characteristics, our model
differentiates labor by industry of employment. To our knowledge, no study has measured
net incentive effects by industry.
4. In an extension of this model, Fullerton (1983) considers cases in which only new
capital investments are mobile across sectors. The interindustry adjustments resulting from
tax changes thus occur more slowly, and the welfare changes from tax reforms are typically
slightly smaller than in the model with instantaneous capital mobility.
5. This assumption is conventional in general equilibrium tax models, but it is very
important for the results they produce. If we were to consider the extreme alternative case
of a small, open, price-taking economy facing a perfectly elastic foreign supply of capital,33 The Single Period Submodel
groups and by government. We denote endowments by Kj(j = 1, . . . ,
12) and Kg. Capital can be used in any of the nineteen producer industries
or in the general government sector. These uses of capital are denoted by
the i subscript inK^i = 1,..., 20). Only consumers have endowments Ej
(j = 1, ... ,12) of labor, but due to consumption of leisure, their actual
supplies are L; (/ = 1, . . . , 12). This factor can be used in any of the
twenty sectors as labor Lt(i = 1,..., 20) or can be retained by consumers
for leisure, €; (;' = 1,.. . , 12). For each consumer, then, we have Ej = L;
+ €;. In total, we have
12 20 12
(3.1) E= X Ej= X Lt+ X €.- = L + €.
j=l i=l y=l
We define each of these factors in service units per period. When a unit
of capital services is rented out for one period, the owner receives a price,
PK, which is net of factor taxes and net of depreciation. In addition to the
rental prices, PL and PK, which are paid to factor owners, producers are
required to pay ad valorem taxes at rates tLi and tKi. These taxes differ by
sector. The i
th factor user thus faces gross-of-tax factor costs of P£, and
PKI, which equal PL(1 + tLi) and PK{\ + tKi), respectively. Capital and labor appear in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
value-added function of the form
(3.2)
CT-l CT-1
o/v + (1 — oJA
CT-l
for each industry,
where <$> and 8 are production parameters, and CT is the elasticity of
substitution.
6 For expositional simplicity, we have suppressed the i sub-
scripts of all variables and parameters in these expressions.
The model uses a 19 x 19 fixed coefficient input-output matrix, de-
noted by A, with columns giving the intermediate input requirements per
unit of output. The industry outputs are represented as Qt, (i = 1, . . . ,
19). In the standard version of the single period submodel we do not allow
for substitution between intermediate inputs and value-added.
A single output is produced by each industry, under constant returns to
scale. Producer behavior is characterized by cost minimization for each
unit of output. Minimization of factor costs (Pf,L + P^K) subject to the
constraint that VA = 1 in equation (3.2) yields the factor demand
requirements per unit of value-added. For each industry, these are:
results could be changed significantly. In this case, capital would not bear the burden of
capital taxes. We return to these issues in chapter 11.
6. Chapter 6 specifies CT for the nineteen industries. In cases where a = 1, equation (3.2)
reduces to a Cobb-Douglas production function. Also, we define capital costs as net of
depreciation. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the constant fraction of value added used for







+ (1 - 5)
1-CT
Given the parameters 8, 4>, and a for each industry, we use the
net-of-tax factor prices together with tax rates to calculate each produc-
er's gross-of-tax price for each factor. Thus the tax system distorts factor
input decisions.
Consumer goods, Xm (m = 1, . . . , 15), are produced from producer
goods, Qi(i = 1,..., 19), through the fixed-coefficient Z matrix shown in
the upper right of figure 3.1. Each coefficient, zim, gives the amount of
producer goods / needed to produce one unit of consumer good m. For
example, a unit of "alcoholic beverages" will include parts of the outputs
of three industries: food and tobacco; transportation, communications,
and utilities; and trade.
We can impose different ad valorem tax rates on each industry's
intermediate purchases from each other industry. State and local motor
vehicle registration fees, for example, are modeled as a tax on intermedi-
ate use of the motor vehicle industry's output, tMVi (i — 1,. . . , 19). Each
industry also pays an output tax at rate tQi on its own output, regardless of
where the output is used.
Because of perfect competition, producers make zero profits after
making payments for factors, factor taxes, intermediate inputs, motor
vehicle input taxes, and output taxes. The zero-profit prices of the nine-
teen producer outputs are P, (i = 1,. . . , 19). Zero-profit conditions also
apply to production of consumer goods. Cost-covering consumer good




Pm= X zimPi m = l,. . . ,15
The expenditure matrix is shown in the lower right of figure 3.1. When
consumers purchase the consumer goods, Xm, they must pay additional
ad valorem taxes. We model sales taxes on the purchase of each good
at rates tm (m = 1, . . . , 15). Gross-of-tax prices paid by consumers are
P* = P (1 + t )
7. An unfortunate effect of using this Z matrix is that differential price effects are
dampened. Each of the fifteen consumer goods is a weighted average of the nineteen
producer goods, with weights given by each column of the Z matrix. The implicit capital/
labor ratios in the construction of each consumer good must therefore vary less than the
capital/labor ratios of producer goods. When factor prices vary, consumer good prices will35 The Single Period Submodel
3.4 Household Saving, Labor Supply, and Commodity Demands
The submodel described in this chapter refers only to a single period.
In chapter 7 we will consider a sequence of equilibrium periods by
incorporating the effects of current savings on the future capital stock and
household income. Within a single period, however, individuals make
savings decisions based on expectations about the resulting increment to
future consumption. We assume that expectations are myopic in the
sense that individuals expect all current prices, including the return to
capital, to remain constant through all future periods. With this assump-
tion, we can calculate the savings of individuals based only on current
prices.
8
Saving decisions are based on the maximization of a nested utility
function, where the outer nest is defined over present consumption and
the expected future consumption stream made possible from saving.
Bequests are excluded, as is any explicit life-cycle structure. Consider the
general case of a consumer who faces the decision of choosing between
consumption today (H) and consumption in future periods (C1,C2,. . .)•
The consumer choice problem can be represented as the maximiza-
tion of
(3.6) U=U(H,CF),
subject to a budget constraint. Here, H is a composite of present con-
sumption goods and leisure, and CFis a composite of the future consump-
tion stream (Ci,C2, . . .). We describe specific functional forms below.
Implicit in these forms is a rate-of-time preference between H and CF. In
the calculations below, we assume CF to be the annual consumption of a
perpetual annuity made possible through the current period's saving.
In a more complete model of life-cycle behavior, households would
calculate, in each period, the discounted present value of resources over
their remaining lifetimes. In this model, by contrast, households in each
period only concern themselves with the allocation of current income
between consumption and saving. While a full lifetime model is beyond
the scope of this book, this important contrast should be emphasized.
9
The structure of our nested CES/Cobb-Douglas utility functions is
outlined in figure 3.2. Each consumer starts with a budget, /, which
vary less than producer prices; consumer purchases will vary less than they would if
consumers bought producer goods directly. However, the weights differ enough to capture
substantial effects.
8. Ballard and Goulder (1982) have investigated the effect of giving consumers foresight
into the movements of relative prices over time. When a capital-deepening tax change is
introduced, consumers will save less if they have foresight, because they see that the return
to capital will decrease over time. The results of our simulations change somewhat,
depending upon the expectational structure, but the magnitude of the change is not great.
9. See Summers 1981 and Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner 1983 for numerical life-
cycle models incorporating tax effects.36 Chapter Three
Utility U is o CES function of present
consumption H and future consumption CF
Present consumption H is a CES function
leisure / and a composite good X
X is a Cobb- Douglas composite of the 15
consumer goods Xm
Each consumer good Xm(e.g., appliances) is a
fixed coefficient mix of the 19 producer goods
(e.g., metals,transportation,and trade).
Each producer good Qj uses fixed proportions
of value added VAj and intermediate inputs Aj
Intermediate inputs are the 19 producer goods,
in fixed proportions for each industry.
Value added VAj is a CES function of
labor Lj and capital Kj
Fig. 3.2 The structure of consumption and production in the model.
equals the rental value of his capital and labor endowments (whether sold
or retained as leisure), plus transfers, minus taxes. We refer to / as
expanded income to differentiate it from observed money income. Be-
cause of the nested CES form, we can divide consumer decisions into
stages. In the first stage, the consumer divides this income between
present consumption, H (costing PH as described later), and future
consumption, CF. Next, the consumer decides how to divide present
consumption, H, into consumption of leisure time, € (costing P€), and a
composite consumption commodity, X (costing P). When we subtract
the values of savings and leisure from /, we have the earned income
available for present goods consumption. Since the composite jood X
has a composite price P, expenditure on consumption goods is PX. In the
final utility nest shown in figure 3.2, individuals divide these expenditures
among the fifteen consumer goods, Xm (m = 1, . . . , 15), according to a
Cobb-Douglas function. Consumers face gross-of-tax prices, P^ (m = 1,
..., 15), on these consumer goods. (Figure 3.2 goes on to show how each
consumer good is a combination of nineteen producer goods, and how
each producer good is a combination of primary factors and intermediate
inputs.)
We assume that consumers use their saving to purchase a saving good,
5. The implicit assumption is that consumer groups own real capital and37 The Single Period Submodel
rent it directly to the ultimate users in industry and the government.
When individuals save, they must add to their stocks of real capital. The
model therefore assumes that the household sector buys investment
goods with their saving. This saving-investment commodity, S, is actually
a composite of the nineteen industry outputs. The nineteen outputs go
into the composite in fixed proportions. The proportions are given by the
observed 1973 total investment purchases from each industry.
1
0
Capital services, K, are measured in units of asset rental per time
period (like machine-hours, except that our capital asset is homo-
geneous). Since we define a unit of K as that which earns PK in the
benchmark period, net of taxes and depreciation, the net saving of
consumers corresponds to the net investment purchases of the nineteen
outputs.
This treatment excludes variations in the composition of investment
that might occur in response to variations in tax rates. For example,
corporate tax reductions might imply a reallocation of capital from real
estate to incorporated industries. The fixed-coefficient composition of S
would not, however, reflect the decreased investment purchases from the
construction industry, or the increased purchases of machinery. Of
course, the model does capture the reallocation of K itself.
The savings commodity can be interpreted as a composite of newly
produced capital goods, since saving is invested immediately. The price
of saving, Ps, can also be interpreted as the composite price of investment
goods. The capital goods purchased with savings will yield a flow of
capital services in the future. This flow can, in turn, be sold for future
consumption. Each unit of S is assumed to yield 7 units of capital services
in each future period, and each of these capital service units is expected to
earn PK per period. (Because PK = 1 in the benchmark year, 7 is the
initial real after-tax rate of return.) The capital income in each future year
finances planned future consumption, which is expected to cost P. There-
fore, PKyS = PCF. If we multiply both sides of this equality by Ps and
rearrange, we have
P P
(3.7) PSS = —— CF, for each consumer.
P
This equation states that the value of saving matches the discounted
present value of expected future consumption. The parameter 7 denotes
the physical service flow per unit of capital goods purchased. We specify 7
exogenously. A given value of savings, PSS, earns a return of PKlS in
every future period. Therefore, the endogenous after-tax rate of return is
10. Firms decide how much capital to use in the current period, but they do not make
explicit intertemporal investment decisions in our model. The intertemporal decisions of
consumers determine future capital stocks.38 Chapter Three
PKy/Ps, which we denote by r. Since the price of consumption goods, P, is
not expected to change, r is also the expected real rate of return.
The consumer's budget constraint is given by
(3.8) I = PHH + PSS,
where / is current expanded income after taxes and transfers, PSS is the
value of saving, and PH is the price of composite present consumption H.
If we use equation (3.7), we can write the consumer's maximization
problem as
(3.9) Max U[H, CF], subject to / = PHH + -^- CF.
P
Each consumer group has its own parameters and values in the CES form
of this utility function, but we suppress indexes for expositional simplic-
ity. The consumer utility function is:
(3.10) U=\a H + (1 — a) CF
where a is a weighting parameter and CT2 is the elasticity of substitution














(3.13) A2 = a(PH)
We discuss PH below. Using equation (3.7) from above, we translate the
demand for CF into the demand for saving:
(3.14) S= —
After saving PSS, consumers have / — PSS to spend on consumption of







where p is a weighting parameter, and o-j is the elasticity of substitution
between X and €. The price of leisure, P€, is taken to be the after-tax
return to labor of each group. Since a unit of labor earns PL after factor
taxes, F€ = PL(1 - T;), where T; is the/
t
h consumer's personal marginal
tax rate. Constrained maximization of the subutility function, H, pro-




(3.19) Aj = (l
We will discuss P below.
After spending Pe£ on leisure, consumers have / - PSS - Pe€ to spend
on the consumption components of X. In the third stage, they maximize a
Cobb-Douglas form for the subutility function




non /_pc_p/> — y Y • P*
The \m weighting parameters are the Cobb-Douglas expenditure shares.
Constrained maximization of the subutility function, X, provides the
demand functions
(3.22)
An important property of the nested Cobb-Douglas and CES utility
functions is that we can derive the indirect utility functions and expendi-
ture functions easily. In the Cobb-Douglas case just described, for exam-
ple, we form the indirect utility function by substituting the demand40 Chapter Three
functions (3.22) into the direct utility function (3.20). If we use lx to




The Cobb-Douglas function is defined such that the sum of the fifteen
coefficients, Km, is unity. Thus we have
(3.23') X=lx II
The indirect utility function in this case expresses subutility, X, as a
function of income, prices, and preference parameters. From here, it is
easy to solve for the expenditure function, which is the income solution of
the indirect utility function.
(3.24) Ix = l
= l
The expenditure function gives the income necessary to reach a given
level of utility under a given configuration of prices.
Note that we can rewrite equation (3.21) as
(3.25) IX
Combining equations (3.24) and (3.25), we see that
1
5
(3.26) P = n
We have used the expenditure function to create a composite price index,
P, from the individual prices, P^. An especially convenient property of
this kind of price index for both the Cobb-Douglas and CES functions is
that the composite price can be calculated without knowing the actual
quantities, Xm. This property simplifies our calculations considerably.
We use similar procedures to derive the expenditure functions for the
CES nests of the utility functions. The function //is a composite of X and
£, and the composite price is
(3.27) PH = [(1 -
If we use IH to denote / - PSS, the income available for expenditure on
//, we have the expenditure function,
(3.28) IH = PHH.41 The Single Period Submodel
As with the Cobb-Douglas nest, the quantity of a composite good times
the composite price equals the expenditure on the good.
The function U is a composite of H and CF, and its composite price is
(3.29) Pv
The overall indirect utility function is U = IIPv, and the overall expendi-
ture function is / = Pv • U.
3.5 Household Income and Taxes
The U.S. personal income tax (PIT) has graduated marginal rates that
differ among income groups. It also includes special features that dis-
criminate by industry. Some industries, for example, are more heavily
incorporated than others, with a higher proportion of capital income in
the form of retained earnings. These industries are more lightly taxed at
the personal level than are other industries in which capital income is
more heavily comprised of dividends and interest. The housing industry is
favored by the PIT, because the imputed net rents of owner-occupied
homes are not taxed. This model incorporates both the increasing mar-
ginal income tax rates by income class and the industrial discrimination of
the PIT.
In order to describe the discriminatory aspects of the personal and
corporate tax systems in more detail, we first calculate each industry's
capital income net of corporate income tax, corporate franchise tax, and
property tax. We denote these figures by CAP( (i = 1, . . . , 19). The
government's payments for privately owned capital are represented by
CAP2Q. The sum of this capital income is received by the twelve consumer
classes in the model. Therefore,
20 12
(3.30) 2 CAP(= 2 CAP,
i=l j = 1
where CAPj is the capital income received by the ;'
t
h consumer class.
Each of the twelve consumer classes has a marginal tax rate on all
capital and labor income, denoted by T; (/ = 1, . . . , 12). We can then
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For each of the nineteen industries and government, we define a fraction,
fi, which is the proportion of that sector's capital income subjected to full
personal income taxation. This fraction will differ across industries for a
number of reasons, including the variance in dividend/retention policies
and differences in the degree to which unincorporated capital qualifies for
the investment tax credit.
In order to capture these intersectoral differences in the taxation of
capital income at the personal level, we employ a construct that we call
the personal factor tax, PFTt (i = 1, . . . , 20). Total capital tax in each
industry is the sum of corporate taxes, property taxes, and the personal
factor tax. For each sector, the total personal factor taxes paid are given
as
(3.32) PFTi^fiCAPi-r, i = l,...,20,
where the personal factor tax rate on CAPt is^T.
It is then possible to define net capital income, NCAPt, as capital
income net of the corporate taxes, property taxes, and the personal factor
tax on capital income in that industry:
(3.33) NCAPt = CAPi - PFTt = CAP^X -ftj).






If we define CAP and NCAP as the sums of CAPt and NCAPt over twenty
sectors, then the last two equations imply:
(3.35) NCAP = CAP(1 -/T) .
This expression provides an average conversion from capital income net
of corporate and property taxes to capital income net of all taxes.
Although consumers in fact receive CAPj (j = 1,..., 12) and pay their
own personal income taxes, we model the PIT on capital income as if it
were paid at the industry level. Since tax at rate T has been paid on an
average/ of capital income CAPj, however, there must be a correction for
differences among the marginal rates at the personal level. The personal
factor tax at the industry level can be viewed as a withholding tax. For
consumer/, with capital income of CAPj, the amount of tax paid at the
industry level is if CAPj. Consumer j should actually pay a tax of43 The Single Period Submodel
Pj, however, so consumers for whom T; exceeds T must pay addi-
tional taxes at the personal level (in addition to the personal factor tax at
the industry level). Those for whom T, falls below T get rebates. Thus the
correction at the personal level is
Cx ifa r = fT. _ T\CA P-T
Since T is the capital-weighted average of the marginal tax rates, the sum
of these corrections at the personal level is zero. Since NCAPj = CAPj
(1 - /T), personal tax correction can also be described as
(3.37) rJ = (jj-7)NCAPj-L=-.
This rearrangement is necessary because our endogenously determined
rental price PK is defined as the amount earned by each unit of capital, net
of all taxes. Net capital income PKKJ is used for NCAPj in equation (3.37)
for our model calculations.
Many transfer payments are not subject to the income tax. In our
model we assume that all transfers are tax-exempt. Labor income is fully
taxable. Therefore we have the following formula for income taxes paid
by group/:
(3.38) T/= Bj + T;AL;. + (T;- - T)PKKJ—
f— .
1-/T
The intercept of each linear tax function, B}, is negative to reflect the fact
that marginal tax rates exceed average tax rates. While marginal changes
in income are taxed at the appropriate marginal rate for each group, this
marginal rate does not change as income changes. Expanded income, /;,
equals transfers plus labor and capital income, plus the value of leisure,
minus income taxes. Since Ej = Lj + €;, we have
(3.39) Ij = 1}
R - B; + EjPL(l - Tj) + PKKj\l - (ry - T) -^-1,
L 1 - /T J
where T* are the lump-sum transfers. Transfer payments are held con-
stant in real terms by a price index on each consumer group's consump-
tion purchases. If the value of leisure, P(€j, were subtracted from this
expression, we could rearrange it using equation (3.38) to obtain a more
usual definition of income:
(3.40) Ij - Ptef = Tj
R + PLLj + PKKj - Tf.
The price of leisure, P€, is equal to PL(1 - T;).44 Chapter Three
3.6 Government Receipts and Expenditures
We divide government activities into two broad categories. Some
publicly supplied goods and services are offered free of charge. We refer
to these as general government activities. Other goods and services are
subject to user charges, even though the charges may not cover costs
(e.g., postal services and some utilities). We refer to these as government
enterprise or industry 19. This industry is modeled like the eighteen
private industries, and its particular data is described in chapter 4. Conse-
quently, we will not describe it in detail here. The remainder of this
section covers the modeling of general government activities.
Expenditures by government other than those for public enterprises
are an element of final demand. We model the government as if it were a
single consumer, with a Cobb-Douglas utility function defined over all
nineteen producer goods, capital, and labor.
1
1 These government expend-
itures do not enter the utility functions of consumers as public goods.
When tax rates are changed for a simulation, the equal yield feature
ensures that enough tax revenue is obtained from an alternative source so
that government expenditures at the new equilibrium prices leave the
government with the utility level it had in the old equilibrium. Conse-
quently, we only need to be concerned with changes in consumer utility
when we want to calculate the total welfare change from some policy.
The government obtains income by collecting taxes and by renting out
its endowment of capital services. It makes redistributive transfer pay-
ments to consumers in a lump-sum fashion; we use data for Social
Security, food stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and
similar programs to determine the amounts of these transfers. These
transfers are held constant in real terms, using a Laspeyres price index for
each consumer group. The government uses the remaining revenues to
buy producer goods at the prices Pt {i = 1, . . . , 19), to buy labor at the
gross-of-tax price PL (1 + t£), and to buy capital at the gross-of-tax price
PK (1 + t%).
The tax rate paid for labor is based on Social Security and railroad
retirement taxes paid by the government and its employees. When the
government pays these taxes on its use of labor, it pays the taxes to itself.
Consequently, the income effects cancel out. However, the price effects
measure correctly the opportunity cost to government of hiring addi-
tional labor.
The tax rate on capital used by government, t^, is more problematic.
Governments in the United States do not typically pay corporate income
taxes or property taxes. If we were to model t^ as only the personal tax on
11. This formulation allows government to purchase quantities that depend at least
somewhat on output prices, but in any case it does not greatly affect the results of the model
that pertain to structural tax reform.45 The Single Period Submodel
that capital income, the government's tax rate on K would be substan-
tially less than the private sector's tax rate. The benchmark equilibrium
would imply a misallocation of capital in favor of government use. Any
reduction in the capital taxes faced by the private sector would imply
reallocation flows from the government sector to the private sector. Since
the gross-of-tax capital price in the private sector reflects the marginal
product of capital, this capital flow from the public to the private sector
would imply (possibly large) welfare gains.
We do not want to contaminate our calculations of the welfare effects
of distorting taxes in this way. Therefore, in our model the entire govern-
ment sector faces a price for capital that is equal to PK{\ + <£), where O is
the weighted average tax rate on capital used in industry. Then, if the
industry tax rates were to change, the government's price would change
accordingly. The new price of capital faced by the government would be
PK • 1 plus the new weighted average industry tax rate. For example, if
industry tax rates were reduced through corporate tax integration, the
price of capital used in government would not change relative to the price





We treat the foreign trade activity of the United States in a simple
manner, so as to close the model.
1
3 In our standard model we do not
differentiate between commodities on the basis of origin, i.e., U.S.-
produced cars and imported cars are considered to be identical.
Foreign trade introduces a difference between the demands of consum-
ing groups in the United States (broadly defined to include business
investment and government purchases) and the demands for products
faced by U.S. domestic industries. We can represent this distinction by
introducing a vector of imports and a vector of exports, using the pro-
ducer good classification of the model. These vectors account for differ-
ences between the demands of U.S. groups and the demands facing U.S.
industries.
12. If the government acts to maximize social welfare, it would recognize that each unit
of capital taken out of the private sector reduces general welfare by the gross-of-tax price
paid by the private purchasers of capital. When government uses another unit of capital, it
gives up not only PK but also the tax revenue that a private producer would pay if that unit of
capital were to be used in the private sector. If the government realizes this and acts to
maximize social welfare, it would charge itself a shadow price equal to PK{\ + 3>).
13. For modeling and results of several alternative trade and international capital flow
specifications in this context, see chapter 11. The treatment of foreign trade in this chapter is
based on Whalley and Yeung 1948. Alternatives include the use of the Armington assump-
tion (that imports differ from domestically produced goods) and the possibility of imbal-
anced commodity through international capital flows. The capital flows might be in capital
goods or in capital services.46 Chapter Three
The demand for U.S. exports by foreigners has a negative price elastic-
ity, while the supply of imports to the United States has a positive price
elasticity. The relative prices of traded goods are determined endoge-
nously in the model. Trade balance is assured, since the export demand
and import supply functions satisfy budget balance.
For each of the nineteen producer goods, we specify foreign export
demand and import supply functions. These functions incorporate pa-
rameters that determine constant price elasticities of import supply and
export demand:
/ iyi i \* Mi) ? -i 1 n .
i = 1,. . . ,19;
FO/pwy, -°° < V < 0
i - 1, . . . ,19;
where M, and Et are import demand and export supply, M? and E? are
constants, P^i is the world price of imports, and P& is the world price of
U.S. exports. These equations imply that the i
th commodity can be both
imported and exported. This phenomenon of crosshauling is evident
from the trade statistics, even with highly disaggregated data, and it
underlies much of the recent literature on intraindustry trade (see Grubel
and Lloyd 1975). There are many reasons for this phenomenon. One
explanation asserts that foreign commodities are qualitatively different
from domestic goods. For example, U.S. and foreign cars are close but
not perfect substitutes. This assumption, first discussed by Armington
(1969), is considered explicitly in chapter 11. Crosshauling can also be
explained by reference to geography and transportation costs. For exam-
ple, it may be perfectly sensible for the United States to export Alaskan
oil to Japan and at the same time import the identical product through
ports on the East Coast and the Gulf of Mexico, given the cost of
delivering Alaskan oil to the eastern United States.
In order to close the system and solve the general equilibrium model,
we add the trade balance constraint:
(3.42) I P^M^l PhEi.
i=\ i=l









We define the relationship between U.S. and world prices through an
exchange rate term, e, as P^f = eP%i and P^f = ePMi. The model is, of
course, a real trade model and has no financial exchange rate variables,47 The Single Period Submodel
but the use of this construct enables us to write foreign import supply and
export demand functions as functions of U.S. prices rather than of world
prices. U.S. prices are determined endogenously in the model. If we
substitute these U.S. prices into (3.43), we have:
(3.44)




Finally, substituting these results into equation (3.41), gives
(3.46)
Note that ^ and u)2 are themselves functions of U.S. import and export
prices. Equations (3.46) can be thought of as foreign import supply and
export demand functions, written as functions of U.S. prices, and incor-
porating zero trade balance. Thus, while equations (3.41) specify import
and export behavior, the (x and v parameters are not supply and demand
elasticities that incorporate trade balance conditions. To derive expres-
sions for an import supply elasticity and export demand elasticity that do
satisfy trade balance, consider a simplified two commodity case in which
each country exports one item and imports the other. Let us say that the
foreigner demands our exports of good 1. Then, suppressing the US
superscript and substituting equations (3.45) into the export equation
(3.46) we have:
(3.47) £l_£l(P£i)^
It is simple to differentiate with respect to PEl and get the own-price
elasticity of export demand:
FD _ (3.48) eE
u =
|X — V48 Chapter Three
Similarly, we can find the own-price elasticity of import supply as:
(3.49) «ff = ^-±^.
(|x-v)
We would like to restrict |x and v so that the export demand curve slopes
downward and the import supply curve slopes upward. These conditions
will be met if |x > 0 and v < — 1.
In the two-good case, equations (3.48) and (3.49) can be used to set
values for \x and v that are consistent with econometric estimates of ejp
and e^
5. We follow the same procedure in our model with nineteen
commodities (see chapter 6).Appendix
Glossary of Notation
These variables are defined in approximately the order they appear in the
text of chapter 3. (Some do not appear in equations until considerably
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Basic model uses 1.75 of
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<J> CES production normalization (3.2)
parameter, for each industry
8 CES factor weighting parameter (3.2)
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a CES elasticity of substitution be- (3.2)
tween K and L for each industry
PK Price of capital, in net rents per
unit each period
PL Price of labor, in net rents per
unit each period
















RL Requirement of labor per unit of (3.3)
output, for each industry
Rfc Requirement of capital per unit (3.4)
of output, for each industry
A 19 x 19 fixed-coefficient input-
output matrix
aik Element of the A input-output
matrix
tMVi Tax on intermediate use of
motor vehicles of the /
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output of the i
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tion, consumer goods, and lei-
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Utility of each consumer
Expanded income of each con-
sumer, from endowments and
transfers after taxes
The price of composite consump-
tion H, for each consumer
Price of leisure, €, for each con-
sumer
Composite of consumer goods,
Xm, for each consumer









good, for each consumer
Price of the savings good, a com- (3.7)
posite of the 19 output prices, as
they are used for investment




House's State Tax Hand-
book
From Pm and tm
From equation (3.15)
From definition as the
annual consumption made
possible by one unit of
saving
Defined in equation (3.10)
Defined in equation
(3.39). Data from Trea-
sury Department Merged
Tax File, and procedures
of chapter 5
Defined in equation (3.27)
Defined as net-of-tax wage
Defined in equation (3.20)
Defined in equation (3.26)
Basic data adjusted from
Consumer Expenditure
Survey
Units convention in bench-
mark, endogenous in any
simulation
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a CES utility-weighting parameter (3.10)
for H and CF, for each consumer
a2 CES utility elasticity of substitu- (3.10)
tion between H and CF, for each
consumer
A2 Notational shorthand for part of
H and CF demands for each con-
sumer
P CES utility-weighting parameter (3.15)
for X and €, for each consumer
CTX CES utility elasticity of substitu- (3.15)
tion between X and €, for each
consumer
ij The marginal personal income (3.31)
tax rate of the ;
t
h consumer
Aj Notational shorthand for part of (3.17)
X and € demands, for each con-
sumer
X.m Cobb-Douglas utility-weighting (3.20)
parameter on the m
ih consumer
good, for each consumer
lx Income after leisure and savings (3.23)
Iff Income after savings (3.28)
Pu Price index for composite utility (3.29)
units
Section 3.5
CAPi Capital payments from the i
t
h in- (3.30)
dustry, net of corporate and
property taxes
CAPj Capital income of the >
t
h con- (3.30)
sumer, net of corporate and
property taxes
CAP Sum of 20 CAPt or of 12 CAPj (3.35)
T Capital-weighted average of the (3.31)
12 consumers' marginal tax rates
fi The proportion of the /
t
h sector's
CAPt that is subject to the per-
sonal income tax




/ The capital-weighted average of (3.34)
the 20 sectors' fi parameters
NCAPi Capital payments from the i
t
h in- (3.33)
dustry, net of all taxes
From calibration, chapter
6
From TI saving elasticity
and calibration, chapter 6
(3.11) Defined in equation (3.13)
From calibration, chapter
6
From labor supply elastic-
ity and calibration, chapter
6
From Treasury Depart-
ment Merged Tax File
Defined in equation (3.19)
From Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey and calibra-
tion, chapter 6
Defined in equation (3.25)
Defined in equation (3.28)
Defined in equation (3.29)
Commerce Department
and procedures of chapter
5
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chapter 5
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Defined in equation (3.31)
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Defined in equation (3.32)
Defined in equation (3.34)
Defined in equation
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ad valorem tax rate on the labor
purchased by government
ad valorem tax rate on the capi-
tal purchased by government
Weighted average industry tax
rate




Constant in import supply








Price elasticity of import supply




Constant in export demand























Merged Tax File; equals
KjPK in simulations





Merged Tax File data, as
defined in equation (3.38)
Treasury Department
Merged Tax File and
calibration, chapter 6
Treasury Department
Merged Tax File data
From Commerce Depart-
ment data on Social Secur-
ity and railroad retirement
taxes paid by government
Set to $> as discussed in
section 3.6
From tKi, weighted by Kt,
for i = 1, . . . , 19
Benchmark data from
OECD trade statistics
Based on benchmark im-
ports
Not used in actual calcula-
tions
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o Foreign price elasticity of de-
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Solved out in equation
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From chapter 6
Denned in equation (3.45)
Denned in equation (3.45)
Defined in equation (3.50)
Denned in equation (3.51)